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CROSS-EXAMINATION OF A WITNESS TO
THE GOOD CHARACTER OF A CRIMINAL
DEFENDANT IN INDIANA
INTRODUCTION
As a general rule the defendant in a criminal prosecution is
allowed to introduce evidence of his good character. Once a witness
has given evidence concerning the defendant's good character, the
prosecution may cross-examine that witness.2 The law in Indiana is
in many respects ill-defined with regard to what is permissible in
the cross-examination of a witness who has attested to the good
character of the accused. This note will clarify the law in that area.
Before discussing the cross-examination of character witnesses,
however, it is important to understand what is meant by "character
evidence" and the manner in which such testimony may be used.
A person's character consists of his actual moral or physical
disposition, or the sum of his traits.' Evidence of the defendant's
character is relevant because it tends to show whether the accused
is the kind of individual who would be likely to have committed the
crime with which he is charged." Nonetheless, it is a widely accepted
rule that the state may not initially introduce testimony as to the
defendant's bad character." Such evidence, it is reasoned, may act to
unduly prejudice the jury against the accused.' On the other hand,
1. C. MCCORMICK. EVIDENCE § 191 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCOR.
MICK]; I J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 52 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
2. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 191; WIGMORE. supra note 1, at § 58.
3. 1& at§52.
Wigmore goes on to say that while some courts have used the term character
to refer to both actual disposition and reputation, this is incorrect. Character is, when
considered for purposes of relevancy, "the actual moral or physical disposition or sum
of traits." Reputation, the community opinion of a person's character, is a means of
evidencing character. Id
This note uses the words character and reputation in the manner described in
WIGMORE. A witness who is described as a "character witness" will be a person who
has been called by the defendant to attest to the good reputation for character of the
accused.
4. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 188; WIGMORE, supra note 1. at § 55.
5. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 190;-WIMORE, surpa note 1, at § 57.
6. Evidence of the defendant's bad character is relevant, but cannot be in-
itially introduced because it may unjustly prejudice the jury against the defendant and
may lead to his condemnation because of his reputation for character and not because
he committed the crime with which he is charged. See WIGMORE. supra note 1, at § 57.
Indiana is in accord. Stewart v. State, 184 Ind. 367, 111 N.E. 307 (1915).
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there is no danger of prejudice in the admission of testimony to the
effect that the defendant is a person of good character.7 Therefore,
the good character of the accused is always admissible.
There are three acknowledged methods by which the defendant
may prove his good character. These are testimony as to the good
reputation of the accused in the community, testimony of the
witness's opinion of the defendant based on personal knowledge, and
evidence of the specific past acts of the accused.' Of the three, the
defendant is limited to the introduction of testimony concerning his
good reputation in the community." Reputation evidence is believed
to avoid the distracting collateral issues which often accompany
testimony as to particular past instances of conduct of the accused.11
The advantage of reputation evidence over opinion evidence in prov-
ing the defendant's good character is not so clear," but opinion
7. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 191; WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 56.
8. According to WIGMORE, up to the beginning of the nineteenth century the
defendant could offer his good character only in capital cases and only in doubtful
cases. Since that time, however, the rule has been that the defendant's good character
is always admissible in a criminal case. See WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 56.
An Indiana case, Kistler v. State, 54 Ind. 400, 406 (1876), specifically
recognizes that at one time evidence of the accused's good character could only be con-
sidered in doubtful cases. In following what was in 1876 the "weight of modern
authority," the court held that "proof of good character constitutes an ingredient to be
considered by the jury in all criminal cases without reference to the apparently con-
clusive or inconclusive character of the other evidence."
Indiana cases do not specifically metion the ancient rule that the defendant
may introduce evidence of his good character only in capital cases, but the Indiana
courts have consistently allowed the introduction of character evidence by the accused
in trials for offenses of a lesser nature. Keener v. State, 89 Ind. App. 629, 167 N.E. 549
(1929) (prosecution for operating an automobile while intoxicated); Baehmer v. State, 25
Ind. App. 597, 58 N.E. 742 (1900) (prosecution for unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor on
Sunday); Shears v. State, 147 Ind. 51, 46 N.E. 331 (1899) (prosecution for larceny); Ran-
dall v. State, 132 Ind. 539, 32 N.E. 305 (1892) (prosecution for petit larceny); Kistler v.
State, 54 Ind. 400 (1876) (prosecution for blackmail).
9. MCCORMICK. supra note 1, at § 186.
10. MCCORMICK. supra note 1, at § 191; VII WIGMORE. supra note 1, at § 1983.
Indiana is in accord. "On direct and redirect examination, one's general reputation on-
ly, as to his general moral character, can be given." Griffith v. State, 140 Ind. 163, 166,
39 N.E. 440, 441 (1895). See also Engleman v. State, 2 Ind. 91 (1850).
11. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 191.
12. WIGMORE states that the original practice in England allowed character
witnesses for the accused to testify concerning their own estimate of the defendant's
character based on personal intimacy. However, in Jones Trial, 31 How. St. Tr. 310
(1809), Lord Ellenborough carelessly commented, "It is reputation; it is not what a per-
son knows." This remark was picked up by the court in Regina v. Rowtan, 10 Cox. Cr.
25 (1865), resulting in the subsequent rule that testimony as to the accused's character
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 2 [1978], Art. 5
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evidence is almost universally disallowed for this purpose. 3
When the defendant calls a witness to attest to the good
character of the accused the prosecution may rebut by cross-
exmination and by presenting extrinsic evidence of the accused's
reputation for bad character." The scope of this note is confined to
the cross-examination of the defendant's character witness in a
criminal case in the State of Indiana. 5 Its purpose is to clarify In-
diana law in this area. The note analyzes Indiana cases which have
dealt with the cross-examination of witnesses who have attested to
the good reputation of the accused, and compares the results of
these cases with the law of other jurisdictions.
Issues involving the cross-examination of a defendant's
character witnesses fall into three classes when studied in the light
of Indiana law. First, the courts of Indiana follow traditional and
widely accepted rules with regard to many aspects of such cross-
examination. Second, some questions which arise concerning the
cross-examination of character witnesses for the accused have not
been specifically decided by the Indiana courts. It is therefore
necessary to consider both Indiana cases which have dealt with
analogous questions and the decisions of other jurisdictions in order
to determine the direction which Indiana would most likely take in
these areas.
The third class includes two issues upon which Indiana follows
founded exclusively on the witness's personal knowledge, is excluded. VII WIGMORE.
supra note 1, at § 1981.
As in England, early American practice does not seem to have known this rule
of exclusion. However, so far as cases have dealt with it, reputation is made the ex-
clusive mode of proof in most states. VII WIGMORE. supra note 1, at § 1983.
13. See note 12 supra.
14. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 191; I WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 58.
Indiana is in accord as to cross-examination. McFord v. State, 90 Ind. 320 (1883).
Stalcup v. State, 146 Ind. 270, 45 N.E. 334 (1896), recognizes the right of the state to
rebut by introducing extrinsic evidence, although the question is not specifically ruled
on.
15. This note deals only with character evidence in criminal cases. Cross-
examination of witnesses as to the reputation for character of another witness, or of a
dead person, such as the deceased in a murder case, are not within its scope. Also, the
issue of the right to cross-examine the accused himself regarding past acts relating to
his character or credibility has been excluded. The note is not concerned with the duty
of the trial judge to instruct the jury as to the weight and effect to be given to
testimony elicited by the cross-examination of the defendant's character witnesses.
This note recognizes that federal cases cited may be affected by the Federal
Rules of Evidence which became effective July 1, 1975. However, the purpose of the
note is to discuss the law in Indiana. Therefore, no attempt will be made to analyze
the Federal Rules.
1978
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minority rules. Specifically, it would seem permissible for the pro-
secutor, in cross-examining witnesses who have attested to the good
reputation of the accused to pose hypothetical questions assuming
the defendant to be guilty of some prior misconduct when there is
no evidence thereof. In addition, the Indiana courts apparently allow
the state to cross-examine character witnesses as to their personal
knowledge of particular instances of past misconduct by the defen-
dant. For reasons that will be explained in this note, the holdings of
the Indiana cases as to both of these issues are undesirable.
As has been stated, once a witness has attested to the defen-
dant's reputation for good character, the prosecution may cross-
examine the witness."6 This cross-examination is used primarily to
refute the good reputation which the defendant has attempted to
claim. 7 Thus the accused can be prevented from creating a false im-
pression by introducing a parade of partisan witnesses." Cross-
examination of the defendant's witness is limited. A discussion of
the manner in which Indiana and other jurisdictions have dealt with
questions arising in this area follows.
RUMORS OR REPORTS OF SPECIFIC PAST ACTS OF MISCONDUCT
ADMISSIBLE
The majority of jurisdictions allow cross-examination of a
defendant's character witnesses as to both the general reputation of
the accused'9 and rumors or reports of the defendant's particular
past misdeeds." Indiana is among these states." Inquiry into specific
16. See note 2 supra.
17. I WIGMORE. supra note 1, at § 58.
18. In the words of the court in Regina v. Rowtan, 10 Cox. Cr. 25 (1865), "If
the prisoner, having a bad character, misleads the court, ... the false impression
should be removed."
19. State v. Hedrick, 534 S.W.2d 578 (Mo. 1976). See also MCCORMICK. supra
note 1, at § 191.
While no Indiana criminal case deals directly with cross-examination of a defen-
dant's character witness as to his knowledge of the accused's general reputation, it
seems logical that this would be permitted. There is less chance of prejudice resulting
from such general questioning than from inquiry concerning rumored specific past
misdeeds of the defendant, which is clearly permitted. Moreover, in a civil case the In-
diana Supreme Court allowed cross-examination of such a witness as to his knowledge
of the general reputation of the accused. Hutts v. Hutts, 62 Ind. 240 (1878).
20. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948); Jones v. State, 120 Ala.
303, 25 So. 204 (1899); Driggers v. State, 36 Ala. App. 637, 61 So. 2d 862 (1952); People
v. Bentley, 131 Cal. App. 2d 687, 281 P.2d 1 (1955); Brindisi v. People, 76 Colo. 244, 230
P. 797 (1924); State v. Jerome, 33 Conn. 265 (1866); Carnley v. State, 143 Fla. 756, 197
So. 441 (1940); Bryant v. State, 236 Ga. 495, 224 S.E.2d 369 (1976); State v. Brown, 53
Idaho 576, 26 P.2d 131 (1933); State v. Barly, 192 Kan. 144, 386 P.2d 221 (1963); Brazles
v. Commonwealth, 267 S.W.2d 73 (Ky. 1954); State v. Powell, 213 La. 811, 35 So. 2d 741
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instances of the accused's past misconduct is not permitted for the
purpose of proving that the acts which are rumored or reported
were actually performed by the defendant,22 but only to test the
credibility of the witness and the extent of his actual knowledge of
the defendant's reputation.23 Thus, a witness to the good reputation
of a defendant on trial for burglary may not be asked whether he
has heard that the defendant was previously convicted of robbery
for the purpose of proving that the defendant has stolen in the past.
But the question may be posed to show that if the witness has heard
the rumor, his evaluation of the accused's reputation is suspect.
A minority of states hold that the prosector may not inquire in-
to reports or rumors of past misdeeds of the accused on cross-
(1948); Allison v. State, 203 Md. 1, 98 A.2d 273 (1933); People v. Rosa, 268 Mich. 462,
256 N.W. 483 (1934); Magee v. State, 200 Miss. 861, 27 So. 2d 858 (1934); State v.
Curry, 372 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1963); State v. Popa, 56 Mont. 587, 185 P. 1114 (1919); State
v. Boyle, 49 Nev. 386, 248 P. 48 (1926); State v. Steenson, 35 N.J. Super. 103, 113 A.2d
203 (1955); State v. Hawkins, 25 N.M. 514, 184 P. 977 (1919); People v. Fay, 270 App.
Div. 261, 59 N.Y.S.2d 127, affd, 296 N.Y. 510, 68 N.E.2d 453, aff'd, 332 U.S. 261 (1945);
State v. Polkamus, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 113, 106 N.E.2d 646 (1951); Taylor v. State, 96 Okla.
Crim. 1, 247 P.2d 749 (1952); State v. Linn, 179 Or. 499, 173 P.2d 305 (1946); Com-
monwealth v. Maslie, 155 Pa. Super. 419, 38 A.2d 403 (1944); State v. Lyles, 210 S.C.
87, 41 S.E.2d 625 (1947); State v. Husman, 66 S.D. 530, 287 N.W. 30 (1939); Walker v.
State, 197 Tenn. 452, 273 S.W.2d 707 (1954); Smith v. State, 411 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Crim.
1967); People v. Hite, 8 Utah 461, 33 P. 254 (1893); Kanter v. Commonwealth, 171 Va.
524, 199 S.E. 477 (1938) (rule recognized by court); State v. Anderson, 46 Wash. 2d 864,
285 P.2d 879 (1955).
21. Shears v. State, 147 Ind. 51, 46 N.E. 331 (1899); McDonel v. State, 90 Ind.
320 (1883). See also note 19 supra.
22. WIGMORE lists three dangers inherent in permitting testimony as to
specific past misdeeds of the defendant: 1) an overstrong tendency to believe the
defendant is guilty merely because he is a likely person to commit such a crime, 2) a
tendency to condemn, not because he is guilty but because he has escaped punishment
for the other offense, and 3) the injustice of attacking one necessarily unprepared to
demonstrate that the attacking evidence is fabricated. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 1, at
§ 194.
23. Anderson v. State, 44 Ala. App. 388, 210 So. 2d 436 (1968); Carnley v.
State, 143 Fla. 756, 197 So. 441 (1940); State v. Hinton, 206 Kan. 500, 479 P.2d 910
(1971); Carter v. State 84 Nev. 592, 446 P.2d 165 (1968); Garza v. State, 129 Tex. Crim.
443, 88 S.W.2d 113 (1935).
Indiana is in agreement. As stated bythe Supreme Court of Indiana in Randall
v. State, 132 Ind. 539, 541, 32 N.E. 305, 306 (1892):
A cross-examination of a witness under such circumstances is in the
nature of a trial of the witness. The facts thus developed had no bearing
on the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused, save as they may
have tended to shake or sustain the credibility of the witness or to
weaken or strengthen his estimate of the character of the accused.
See also Jordan v. State, 232 Ind. 265, 110 N.E.2d 558 (1953); Woods v. State,
233 Ind. 320, 119 N.E.2d 558 (1954) (dictum).
et al.: Cross-Examination of a Witness to the Good Character of a Crimina
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examination of his character witnesses. 24 Their rationale for ex-
cluding this evidence is that it has the effect of prejudicing the jury
against the defendant.25 It is argued that when a question is posed
as to reports or rumors of the accused's past misconduct, the jurors
tend to assume the fact of such misconduct. 2 Therefore, these
jurisdictions allow character witnesses to be cross-examined only as
to their knowledge of the accused's general reputation. While this
serves to mitigate the admitted danger of prejudice, it makes the
cross-examiner's task of effectively testing the credibility and
knowledge of the witness very difficult. The majority approach is
superior in this regard.
The cross-examination of a defendant's character witness as to
rumors or reports of the past misdeeds of the accused is a very ef-
fective method of determining the credibility of the witness. When a
witness testifies to the good reputation of the defendant, the reputa-
tion must be indicative of the "general and unqualified concensus of
opinion in the community."' If rumors of flagrant misconduct are
known to the witness, such knowledge is inconsistent with the
witness' broad assertion of the defendant's reputation for good
character.28 Moreover, if it is shown that such rumors have been cir-
culated but are unknown to the witness, the extent of the witness'
knowledge of the reputation of the accused becomes suspect.
An example demonstrating the effectiveness of cross-
examination of the defendant's character witness regarding reports
or rumors concerning past acts of the accused's misconduct is found
in Long v. State,' a case which dealt with cattle rustling. The accus-
ed called a witness who attested to the good reputation of the defen-
dant. On cross-examination the witness admitted to having heard
that the accused had a case pending against him in another county
for "stealing cattle." One may reasonably infer that upon hearing
this testimony the jurors doubted the witness had an idea of what a
good reputation was.
24. State v. Williams, 111 Ariz. 511, 533 P.2d 1146 (1975); People v. Redmond,
50 Ill. 2d 313, 278 N.E.2d 766 (1972); State v. Hunt, 287 N.C. 360, 215 S.E.2d 40 (1975).
25. People v. Page, 365 Ill. 524, 6 N.E. 845 (1937).
26. When counsel in cross-examination asks a witness if he has not
heard that defendant has been guilty of some specific and particularly
atrocious crime, even though the witness may answer in the negative, the
average juror is extremely apt to assume from the mere fact the question
has been asked that rumors at least to that effect are afloat, and even
perhaps that those rumors are true.
Viliberghi v. State, 45 Ariz. 275, 278, 43 P.2d 210, 212 (1935).
27. III A WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 988 (Cladbourne rev. 1970).
28. I WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 197.
29. Long v. State, 61 Okla. Crim. 274, 67 P.2d 980 (1937).
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The possibility of prejudice to the defendant is also apparent in
the above example. There is an admitted danger that the jury might
convict the defendant merely because they feel that he is a bad man.
However, the danger of prejudice can be mitigated by the general
requirement that the trial judge instruct the jury that evidence of
former misconduct of the accused may be considered only for the
purpose of discrediting the witness and testing his knowledge.' In-
structions cannot erase from the minds of the jurors all biases which
may have been created by the testimony. Nonetheless, conscientious
jurors will attempt to conform to the judge's instructions, limiting
the prejudicial effect created by the evidence.
Before rumors of his past misconduct can be inquired into, the
defendant must have claimed good character through the introduc-
tion of testimony by witnesses as to his good reputation. If the ac-
cused fears adverse testimony resulting from the cross-examination
of his character witnesses, he has the option of not calling them to
begin with. 1
For the reasons that have been discussed, the value of evidence
obtained by the cross-examination of character witnesses as to
specific past instances of misconduct by the accused outweighs the
danger of prejudice. On the balance it would seem the better view is
that this kind of evidence should be admissible.
In any event the law in Indiana at this time is clearly that
witnesses who have attested to the defendant's good reputation may
be cross-examined with regard to rumors or reports of the defen-
dant's past misconduct.2 Restrictions upon the admissibility of
testimony concerning such rumors or reports will be discussed
below.
Source of Rumors or Reports
In determining what is permissible in the cross-examination of
the defendant's character witnesses it is necessary to point out
limitations concerning the source of rumors or reports of past
misdeeds. Specifically to be considered are, 1) the place of the
reputation attested to, 2) the number of people from whom the
witness has heard a rumor or report, and 3) reports which were not
heard by word-of-mouth, but which were read in the newspapers or
in other published materials.
30. Baehmer v. State, 25 Ind. App. 597, 58 N.E. 741 (1900).
31. See notes 5 through 8 supra.
32. See note 21 supra.
1978]
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1.) Place of Reputation
Traditionally, testimony concerning the reputation of the accused
for character has been limited to that reputation which prevails
in the community in which the accused lives.3 Some jurisdictions in-
terpret this requirement broadly and admit evidence of the defen-
dant's reputation in any probative "community."' Probative com-
munities might include localities where the accused does not reside
but in which he is well known, such as his professional circle or
place of work. 5 Thus, in a Florida case character evidence was ad-
mitted concerning the reputation of the defendant in the area where
he worked as a hotel employee."
In Indiana testimony as to the reputation of the accused is still
limited to that reputation by which the accused is known in the area
in which he makes his home. 7 However, evidence may be allowed
regarding the defendant's reputation in a neighborhood in which he
formerly lived." It would also seem that a character witness may be
questioned as to reports or rumors of past misdeeds which the ac-
cused perpetrated at some place other than the defendant's home
neighborhood, so long as the rumors or reports were heard in that
home neighborhood."
2.) Number of Persons from Whom the Report Must Have Been
Heard
There appears to be no requirement in Indiana concerning the
number of people from whom the witness must have heard reports
of past acts of the accused for the reports to be admissible. In only
two cases has this issue been considered. Both were decided by Ten-
33. V WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1615.
34. Hamilton v. State, 129 Fla. 219, 176 So. 89 (1937); State v. Jackson, 373
S.W.2d 4 (Mo. 1963); Jordan v. State, 163 Tex. Crim. 287, 290 S.W.2d 666 (1956).
In light of modern living conditions which often cause a person to be better
known in his place of employment or recreation than in the locality of his residence,
this may well be the better view. Indeed, MCCORMICK takes this position. MCCORMICK,
supra note 1, at § 191.
35. 1l
- 36. Hamilton v. State, 129 Fla. 219, 176 So. 89 (1937).
37. Randall v. State, 132 Ind. 539, 32 N.E. 305 (1905); McDonel v. State, 90
Ind. 320 (1883); Rawles v. State, 56 Ind. 492 (1863); Beauchamp v. State, 6 Blackf. 299
(1844).
38. Bryant v. State, 205 Ind. 372, 186 N.E. 322 (1933).
39. Randall v. State, 132 Ind. 539, 32 N.E. 305 (1892).
Testimony was admitted concerning a witness who had attested to the defen-
dant's good character having heard that the accused had been arrested in another
county on a charge of malicious trespass.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 2 [1978], Art. 5
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nessee courts. The earlier of the two' held that "the witness must
have heard a sufficient number of persons speak ... that he believes
that he knows what the majority would say if called on to speak.""
The latter case found that the number of persons from whom the
witness heard reports is immaterial.'2
Indiana, along with the great majority of jurisdictions, has not
ruled directly on this question. From the language of the Indiana
decisions it may be inferred that so long as the defendant's
character witness has actually heard a rumor or report of a former
misdeed perpetrated by the accused, his testimony as to that rumor
or report is admissible on cross-examination. There would seem to
be no minimum requirement regarding the number of rumors or
reports heard or the number of persons from whom a rumor or
report was heard before cross-examination thereto is admissible.
3.) Newspaper Articles and Other Published Reports
Another issue with which Indiana has not specifically dealt is
whether a witness who has attested to the defendant's good
character may be cross-examined as to his knowledge of newspaper
articles or other published reports of the accused's past misdeeds. In
other jurisdictions at least one court has excluded this kind of
evidence on the ground that what is printed in the media is not in-
dicative of reputation."
The traditional approach allows the witness to be cross-
examined concerning such printed reports,'5 and this appears to be
the preferable view. As the court said in United States v. Blane,"
"Newspaper accounts may be as much a part of a community's
thinking regarding the reputation of an individual as rumors and
suspicions that circulate orally among his neighbors and associates."
40. Poole v. State, 2 Baxt. 288 (Tenn. 1872).
41. Id. at 294.
42. Tucker v. State, 149 Tenn. 98, 257 S.W. 850 (1923).
43. "One of the witnesses testifying to the good character of appellant ... was
asked ... if he had ever heard the people talking about appellant ... stealing chickens
.Shears v. State, 147 Ind. 51, 53, 46 N.E. 331, 332 (1899).
"The [character] witness was then cross-examined at considerable length, and,
among other things, testified to having heard of the arrest of the accused . Ran-
dall v. State, 132 Ind. 539, 541, 32 N.E. 305, 306 (1892).
44. Commonwealth v. Colandro, 231 Pa. 343, 80 A. 571 (1911).
45. United States v. Blane, 375 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1967); People v. Stevens, 5
Cal. 2d 92, 53 P.2d 133 (1935); People v. Kuss, 32 N.Y.2d 436, 299 N.E.2d 249, 345
N.Y.S.2d 1002, cer. denied, 415 U.S. 913 (1973).
46. United States v. Blane, 357 F.2d 249, 251 (6th Cir. 1967).
1978]
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The reasoning in Blane seems logical. It is true that the act
reported in the press may have been committed at a place other
than the defendant's neighborhood. However, cross-examination as
to reports of such geographically remote misconduct is permissible
as long as the report is read in the community in which the accused
lives.'7 Likewise, testimony regarding media reports of the defen-
dant's past acts ought not be excluded because the reports were
printed or broadcast at a place distant from the home of the accus-
ed. The rule is that the reputation which may be attested to is that
prevailing in the community in which the defendant resides."" As the
Blane court pointed out, media reports read or heard in this area
are bound to indicate the reputation of the accused. They should
therefore be admissible on cross-examination to refute the good
reputation to which the accused's witness has attested.
Extent and Scope of Cross-Examination
Trial judges in Indiana" and throughout the United States5w are
vested with broad discretion in regard to permitting a prosecutor to
cross-examine character witnesses as to rumors or reports of par-
ticular past misdeeds of the defendant. While the scope of such
cross-examination is largely dependent upon the judge's discretion, 1
certain general rules have evolved limiting what the state may ask
the defendant's character witnesses. Abuse of discretion by the trial
court is a ground for reversal."
47. See note 39 supra
48. See notes 33 through 37 supra.
49. Baehner v. State, 25 Ind. App. 597, 58 N.E. 741 (1900) (recognized).
50. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948) (recognized); Romez v.
State, 225 Ala. 24, 141 So. 907 (1932); People v. Burwell, 44 Cal. 2d 16, 279 P.2d 744,
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 936 (1955); People v. Futamata, 140 Colo. 233, 343 P.2d 1058
(1959); State v. Carroll, 188 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. 1945) (recognized); State v. Steenson, 35
N.J. Super. 103, 113 A.2d 203 (1955) (recognized); Taylor v. State, 96 Okla. Crim. 1, 247
P.2d 749 (1952); State v. Linn, 179 Or. 499, 173 P.2d 305 (1946); State v. Lyles, 210 S.C.
87, 41 S.E.2d 624 (1947).
51. United States v. Silverman, 430 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1970); Ellis v. State, 39
Ala. App. 325, 100 So. 2d 725, cert. denied, 100 So. 2d 732 (1964); State v. Hild, 240
Iowa 119, 39 N.W.2d 139 (1949); State v. Wilson, 248 S.W.2d 857 (Mo. 1952); State v.
Newte, 188 Neb. 412, 197 N.W.2d 403 (1972); State v. Williams, 16 N.J. Super. 372, 84
A.2d 756 (1951) (recognized); People v. Clemente, 285 App. Div. 258, 136 N.Y.S.2d 779
(1954); Taylor v. State, 96 Okla. Crim. 1, 247 P.2d 749 (1952); State v. Shull, 131 Or.
224, 282 P.2d 237 (1929); Zirkle v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 862, 55 S.E.2d 24 (1949)
(recognized).
Accord, Randall v. State, 132 Ind. 539, 32 N.E. 305 (1892).
52. United States v. Polack, 442 F.2d 446, cert. denied, 403 U.S. 931 (1971)
(recognized); Jeel v. State, 53 Okla. Crim. 200, 11 P.2d 197 (1932).
Indiana recognized this rule in Wachstetter v. State, 99 Ind. 290 (1884).
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1.) Details of Defendant's Past Misdeeds Generally Not Admissible
The courts of other states have tended to disallow the introduc-
tion of evidence describing the details of incidents of the accused's
past misconduct during the cross-examination of the defendant's
character witnesses.' Hopefully, this would be the position taken by
the Indiana courts. The only reason the prosecution is allowed to
question the character witnesses as to rumors or reports of the ac-
cused's misconduct is to test his credibility and his knowledge of the
defendant's reputation. Evidence to the effect that the witness had
heard that the asccused had committed some reprehensible act
should be enough in itself to shake the credibility of the witness.
Assume that in a rape case a witness who has attested to the
good reputation of the defendant for "peace and quietude" admitted
on cross-examination that he had heard reports of the accused hav-
ing been convicted of rape at an earlier date. This testimony would
surely cause the jury to doubt the value of the witness's estimate of
the defendant's reputation. Additional questions regarding par-
ticularly gruesome or disgusting details of the previous crime would
therefore not be needed to discredit the witness, and could greatly
prejudice the jurors against the defendant. Testimony as to the par-
ticulars surrounding the accused's past misdeeds may raise confus-
ing side issues which do not pertain in any way to the case at bar.
Because such evidence is unnecessary and fraught with danger, it
should be excluded.
2.) Nature of Misdeeds: Character Trait Involved
A traditional rule in Indiana and in many other juridications
has been that evidence introduced for the purpose of illustrating the
good character of the accused must relate to the nature of the
charge against him." The purpose of this rule is to confine the jury's
Although Wachstetter deals with the cross-examination of witnesses who attested to
the good character of the defendant's character witness, it is logical that the reasoning
would also apply to cross-examination of the accused's character witness.
53. State v. Carroll, 138 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. 1945); Magee v. State, 198 Miss. 642,
22 So. 2d 245 (1945); State v. Williams, 16 N.J. Super. 372, 84 A.2d 756 (1951)
(recognized); Schroeder v. State, 142 Tex. Crim. 443, 154 S.W.2d 480 (1941).
54. "The rule is that the character a defendant is permitted to introduce in
evidence is the character involved in the charge." Baehner v. State, 25 Ind. App. 597,
599, 58 N.E. 741, 742 (1900). The rule was applied in early English cases such as Cap-
tain Kidd's Trial, 14 How. St. Tr. 146 (1701); and Dover's Trial, 6 How. St. Tr. 539
(1663). It is still in effect in modern decisions. State v. Blake, 157 Conn. 99, 249 A.2d
232 (1968); Hallenger v. State, 14 Md. App. 43, 286 A.2d 213 (1974).
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attention to the basic issue of guilt or innocence and avoid possible
excursions into collateral matters.
It follows that in order to avoid prejudice," rumors or reports
of specific instances of misconduct about which the defendant's
character witnesses are cross-examined the evidence must involve
the character trait which the accused "put in issue" on direct, i.e.,
the trait relevant to the commission of the crime for which he is being
tried. 7 Thus, in a Kentucky case in which a witness had attested to
the good reputation of the accused for "peace and quietude," it was
held to be reversible error to admit testimony on cross-examination
regarding the defendant's reputation for having engaged in the il-
legal traffic of intoxicating liquors."
Past Indiana cases indicate an alignment with the majority
rule. That is to say the specific past acts about which the accused's
character witnesses may be questioned must relate to the trait in-
volved in the crime with which he is charged." However, language
used in McDonel v. State' indicates that if the defendant was in-
advertently allowed to introduce testimony as to his good reputation
for a character trait not involved in the commission of the crime for
which he is being tried, the state would likely be allowed to cross-
examine the character witness about rumors or reports of past
misdeeds involving the character trait attested to. Accoring to the
McDonel court "when a witness testifies that such reputation is
good with respect to some quality or disposition, it is competent to
show by its cross-examination that he has heard reports at variance
with the reputation he has given the party for the purpose of im-
peaching the witness' credibility.""1
55. State v. Steenson, 35 N.J. Super. 103, 107, 113 A.2d 203, 205 (1955).
56. People v. Tucker, 164 Cal. App. 2d 624, 331 P.2d 160 (1958).
57. Aaron v. United States, 397 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1968); Scott v. State, 34 Ala.
App. 18, 37 So. 2d 670, cert denied, 251 Ala. 440, 37 So. 2d 674 (1948) (recognized);
State v. Ferro, 108 Ariz. 268, 496 P.2d 129 (1972); People v. Tucker, 164 Cal. App. 2d
624, 331 P.2d 160 (1958); State v. Bryant, 242 Iowa 382, 44 N.W.2d 690 (1950); Smith v.
Commonwealth, 206 Ky. 728, 268 S.W. 328 (1925); Magee v. State, 198 Miss. 642, 22 So.
2d 245'(1945) (recognized); State v. Wilson, 34 S.W.2d 98 (Mo. 1930) (recognized); State
v. Steenson, 35 N.J. Super. 103, 112 A.2d 203 (1955); Commonwealth v. Hurt, 163 Pa.
Super. 232, 60 A.2d 828 (1948); State v. Lyles, 210 S.C. 87, 41 S.E.2d 625 (1947); Ken-
nedy v. State, 150 Tex. Crim. 215, 200 S.W.2d 400 (1947) (recognized).
58. Albertson v. Commonwealth, 312 Ky. 68, 226 S.W.2d 523 (1950).
59. This rule is recognized by the court in McDonel v. State, 90 Ind. 320
(1883). See also note 36 supra
60. McDonel v. State, 90 Ind. 329, 325 (1883).
61. Id.
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3.) Former Convictions, Prosecutions, Arrests
Under the rule that allows cross-examination of character
witnesses concerning rumors or reports of the defendant's particular
past misdeeds, inquiry as to reports of prior arrest,6 2 prosecutions,"
and convictions" of the accused is generally permissible. Logically
the previous criminal proceeding must relate to the character trait
now in issue. Shears v. State,65 illustrates that this is the rule in In-
diana. In Shears, a witness who had attested to the good reputation
of the accused was allowed to testify on cross-examination that he
had heard that the defendant had previously been arrested and con-
victed for malicious trespass.
A recent case which is indicative of Indiana's positon on this
matter is Jordan v. State." The Jordan court held that it was proper
to question a character witness with regard to a supposed arrest
and conviction of the accused for assault and battery. 7 While the
question in Jordan was posed in hypothetical form and the answer
62. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948); Johnson v. State, 34 Ala.
App. 623, 43 So. 2d 424, cert. denied 253 Ala. 194, 43 So. 2d 431 (1949); People v.
Logan, 41 Cal. 2d 279, 260 P.2d 20 (1953); De Jarnette v. State, __ Del. ., 338
A.2d 117 (1975); Bryant v. State, 236 Ga. 495, 224 S.E.2d 369 (1976); State v. McDonald,
57 Kan. 537, 46 P. 966 (1896); Hendron v. Commonwealth, 487 S.W.2d 275 (Ky. 1972);
State v. Banks, - La. __, 307 So. 2d 594 (1975); Comi V. State, 202 Md. 472, 97
A.2d 129, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 898 (1953); State v. Carroll, 188 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. 1945);
State v. Steenson, 35 N.J. Super. 103, 113 A.2d 203 (1955) (recognized); State v.
Polkamus, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 113, 106 N.E.2d 646 (1951); Serggo v. State, 509 P.2d 1374
(Okla. Crim. 1973); Commonwealth v. Masline, 155 Pa. Super. 419, 38 A.2d 403 (1944);
Love v. State, __ Tex. Crim. -, 533 S.W.2d 6 (1976).
63. Lawrence v. United States, 56 F.2d 555 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S.
565 (1932); Driggers v. State, 36 Ala. App. 637, 61 So. 2d 865 (1952); Ellison v. Com-
monwealth, 272 Ky. 364, 114 S.W.2d 130 (1937); Avery v. State, 15 Md. App. 520, 292
A.2d 728 (1972); Moore v. State, 142 Tex. Crim. 99, 151 S.W.2d 595 (1941).
64. United States v. Rudolph, 403 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1968); Flournoy v. State,
34 Ala. App. 23, 37 So. 2d 218 (1948), cerL denied, 251 Ala. 285, 37 So. 2d 323; Brindisi
v. People, 76 Colo. 244, 230 P. 797 (1924); State v. Brown, 53 Idaho 476, 26 P.2d 131
(1933) (recognized); State v. Kirtdall, 206 Kan. 208, 478 P.2d 188 (1970); Brazles v. Com-
monwealth, 267 S.W.2d (Ky. 1954); Taylor v. State, 28 Md. App. 560, 346 A.2d 718
(1975); People v. Basemore, 36 Mich. App. 256, 193 N.W.2d 335 (1971); State v. McCoy,
458 S.W.2d 356 (Mo. 1970); People v. Clemente, 285 App. Div. 258, 136 N.Y.S.2d 779
(1954); State v. Danser, 116 N.J.L. 487, 184 A. 800 (1936); Ellis v. State, 54 Okla. Crim.
295, 19 P.2d 972 (1933); State v. Franhofer, 134 Or. 378, 293 P. 921 (1930); Com-
monwealth v. Amos, 445 Pa. 927, 284 A.2d 748 (1971); Hines v. State, 515 S.W.2d 670
(Tex. Crim. 1974).
65. Shears v. State, 147 Ind. 51, 46 N.E. 331 (1899).
66. Jordan v. State, 232 Ind. 265, 110 N.E.2d 751 (1953).
67. "Let us assume that the defendant was arrested and convicted in 1945 for
assault and battery, would that change your opinion as to his reputation for peace and
quietude?" Jordan v. State, 232 Ind. 265, 266, 110 N.E.2d 751, 752 (1953).
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did not depend upon whether the witness had heard rumors or
reports, the indication is that the court would follow Shears in per-
mitting cross-examination of character witnesses concerning rumors
or reports of prior arrests, prosecutions, and convictions.
A related issue is whether testimony of former commission of
similar misdeeds is admissible. The defendant may have perpetrated
an act of misconduct in the past which was the same as, or similar
to, the crime for which he is presently on trial. This past misdeed
certainly involves the same character trait as the crime with which
he is charged. Rumors or reports of the prior misconduct will
therefore be admissible on cross-examination of the defendant's
character witness."
A prior Indiana case provides a good example." The defendant
was charged with larceny. The court allowed the prosecutor to
cross-examine a witness who had attested to the reputation of the
accused for "honesty and integrity" in regard to whether he had
heard that on previous occasions the defendant had stolen chickens
and robbed a spring house.
4.) Time of Other Misdeeds or Reports Thereof
The admissibility of testimony involving a character witness'
knowledge of rumors or reports of the defendant's past misdeeds
may be affected by issues involving time. Specifically, cross-
examination as to a rumored or reported act may be excluded if a)
the act was committed at a date very remote in time from the
perpetration of the crime charged, b) the act occurred after the
misdeed for which the defendant is being tried, or c) the rumor or
report was heard after the commission of the crime charged. A
discussion of the rationale of these general rules along with a state-
ment of Indiana's position with regard to them follows.
68. Spallito v. United States, 39 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1930); Sanders v. State, 243
Ala. 691, 11 So. 2d 740 (1943); People v. Perry, 144 Cal. 748, 78 P. 284 (1904); Carnley v.
State, 143 Fla. 756, 197 So. 441 (1940); Rucker v. State, 135 Ga. 391, 69 S.E. 541 (1910;
State v. Arnold, 12 Iowa 479 (1861); State v. McDonald, 57 Kan. 537, 46 P. 966 (1896);
Wright v. Commonwealth, 267 Ky. 441, 102 S.W.2d 376 (1937); State v. Green, 127 La.
830, 54 So. 45 (1911); Comi v. State, 202 Md. 472, 97 A.2d 129, cert. denied, 346 U.S.
898 (1953); Smith v. State, 112 Miss. 802, 73 So. 793 (1916), overruled on other grounds
in Ladnier v. State, 155 Miss. 348, 124 So. 432 (1929); State v. Carson, 239 S.W.2d 532
(Mo. App. 1951); State v. Boyle, 49 Nev. 386, 248 P. 48 (1926); People v. Laudiero, 192
N.Y. 304, 85 N.E. 132 (1908); Taylor v. State, 96 Okla. Crim. 1, 247 P.2d 749 (1952);
State v. Linn, 179 Or. 499, 173 P.2d 305 (1946); Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 143 Pa.
Super. 331, 17 A.2d 714 (1941); Farland v. State, 149 Tex. Crim. 516, 196 S.W.2d 829
(1946); State v. Robinson, 24 Wash. 2d 909, 167 P.2d 986 (1946).
69. Shears v. State, 147 Ind. 51, 46 N.E. 331 (1897).
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a.) Remoteness
In State v. Willard,"' the Missouri Supreme Court held that the
trial court had erred in permitting cross-examination of a character
witness regarding a crime allegedly committed by the defendant
fourteen or fifteen years before the date of the trial. The court
reasoned that witnesses who have attested to the good character of
the accused should not be cross-examined about past misdeeds of
the defendant so remote in time as to furnish, by their very
remoteness, strong inference of the defendant's reformation. Other
courts have also held that the questioning of the defendant's
character witnesses with regard to misdeeds perpetrated by the ac-
cused in the distant past is not permissible. 71 However, in many
cases the trial court has been found to have properly exercised its
discretion in admitting cross-examination as to rumored instances of
misconduct which took place as many as twenty-seven years prior to
the commission of the crime which the defendant was charged.72
The Indiana courts have not directly ruled on this point. In the
analogous area of impeachment of witnesses by the introduction of
evidence concerning the witnesses' reputation for character, Indiana
courts have consistently held that such reputation evidence must
relate to the time at which the witness sought to be impeached is
examined. 7 It may therefore be inferred that past misdeeds of the
defendant which occurred at a very remote date should not be ad-
missible.7"
It is difficult to determine just how long ago an act must have
occurred to render it inadmissible. It is clear from two Indiana cases
that the misdeed would have to have been accomplished at a date
relatively remote in time from the commission of the crime charged.
70. State v. Willard, .92 S.W. 437 (Mo. 1917).
71. Amos v. State, 209 Ark. 55, 189 S.W.2d 611 (1945); Nichols v. State, 312
Ky. 171, 226 S.W.2d 796 (1950); State v. Carroll, 188 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. 1945); Stinson v.
State, 120 Tex. Crim. 456, 49 S.W.2d 468 (1932) (recognized); Jenkins v. State, 146 Tex.
Crim. 364, 175 S.W.2d 83 (1943) (recognized).
72. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
73. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Ribkee, 92 Ind. App. 611, 174 N.E. 427 (1930);
Klintz v. State, 71 Ind. App. 225, 124 N.E. 739 (1919); Rawles v. State, 56 Ind. 433
(1877); City of Aurora v. Cobb, 21 Ind. 492 (1863); Roger v. Lewis, 19 Ind. 405 (1862).
74. However, it should be noted that in impeaching a character witness by in-
troduction of evidence of the witness's conviction of a crime, the question of whether
the evidence can be excluded as too remote is apparently within the discretion of the
trial court. Way v. State, 224 Ind. 280, 66 N.E.2d 608 (1946); Denny v. State, 190 Ind.
76, 129 N.E. 308 (1921).
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In Jordan v. State,"5 a witness who had attested to the defendant's
good character was properly cross-examined as to an alleged arrest
and conviction of the accused which apparently took place seven or
eight years prior to the commission of the crime for which the
defendant was on trial." In the more recent case of Lineback v.
State," the court allowed the prosecutor to ask a character witness
about the defendant's having been declared an "incorrigible
juvenile" at a date eight years prior to the perpetration of the crime
charged.
b.) Exclusion of Reports of Acts Committed After the Crime
Charged
A further limitation involving the time element placed upon
the introduction of character evidence is the general rule forbidding
the defendant's use of testimony concerning his reputation at a time
after the commission of the crime for which he is on trial." The deci-
sion in In Re Darrow demonstrates Indiana's adherence to the rule."
Darrow involved a disbarment proceeding. The attorney/defen-
dant called a witness who testified on direct examination as to the
accused's reputation for good moral character, his character for
honesty and his professional character. It was held that this
testimony was properly excluded because it extended to a time
beyond the occurrence of the incident for which the disbarment pro-
ceeding was initiated. The rule as stated in Darrow and as followed
in subsequent Indiana cases is:
[W]hen a party to a criminal or other case is entitled
to prove his good character, it is limited to the trait of
character involved in the crime charged. But such
evidence must be limited to proof of such person's
75. Jordan v. State, 232 Ind. 265, 110 N.E.2d 752 (1953).
76. The matter inquired into allegedly occurred in 1945. The Supreme Court
of Indiana heard the case in 1953. Jordan v. State, 232 Ind. 265, 110 N.E.2d 752 (1953).
77. Lineback v. State, 260 Ind. 503, 301 N.E.2d 636, affd on rehearing, 260
Ind. 503, 301 N.E.2d 636 (1973), cerL denied, 415 U.S. 929 (1974).
78. It should be noted that WIGMORE reasons that since a defendant's reputa-
tion for character will probably have suffered as a result of his being charged with a
criminal act, it would not be harmful to allow him to introduce evidence of his good
reputation post litem motam. The danger lies in allowing the prosecution to introduce
testimony as to the defendant's bad reputation at a time after the perpetration of the
crime charged. WIGMORE concedes that the general rule excludes evidence concerning
either the good or the bad reputation of the accused post litem motam. V WIGMORE,
supra note 1, at § 1618 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
79. In Re Darrow, 175 Ind. 44, 92 N.E. 369 (1910).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 2 [1978], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol12/iss2/5
CHARA CTER EVIDENCE
character as to such trait as it existed before the alleged
offense or "ante litum moturn."'
Other jurisdictions hold that the defendant's character witness
may attest only to the reputation of the defendant prior to the
perpetration of the crime whether the testimony is the result of
direct or cross-examination. Thus, the witness may not be asked
about rumors or reports of particular misdeeds of the accused which
occurred after the act for which he is on trial." The rationale is that
the reputation for character with which the court is concerned is the
reputation of the defendant at the time the offence he is charged
with was committed. Since the reputation of the accused is bound to
suffer as a result of his being placed on trial, testimony concerning
rumors or reports of misconduct which occurred after the offense
with which the defendant is charged would be prejudicial. Such
evidence would be likely to distort the jury's picture of the defen-
dant's reputation."2
Indiana does not allow the accused to introduce evidence of his
good reputation for character as it existed at a time after the com-
niission of the crime for which he is being tried.' In light of this
rule, if the prosecution were permitted to inquire as to misdeeds of
the defendant reported to have been perpetrated after the act with
which the accused is charged, the state would be given an unfair ad-
vantage. It is undoubtedly desirable to disallow this unjust advan-
tage and guard against the danger of undue prejudice as discussed
above. Therefore, it may be reasonably inferred that Indiana courts
would not permit cross-examination of character witnesses concern-
ing misdeeds done by the defendant after the commission of the
crime with which he is charged.
The same reasoning can be applied to the question of whether
rumors or reports of the defendant's misconduct which were heard
by a character witness subsequent to the commission of the crime
80. Keener v. State, 89 Ind. App. 629, 167 N.E. 549 (1929); Wolf v. State, 89
Ind. App. 463, 166 N.E. 883 (1929).
81. Anderson v. State, 44 Ala. App. 388, 210 So. 2d 436 (1968); State v. Powell,
172 Iowa 208, 154 N.W. 488 (1915); State v. Rever, 203 La. 330, 14 So. 2d 14 (1943); Peo-
ple v. Hill, 258 Mich. 79, 241 N.W. 873 (1932); White v. State, - Miss. - 290 So.
2d 616 (1974); State v. Carson, 239 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. App. 1951); State v. Steenson, 35
N.J. Super. 103, 113 A.2d 203 (1955); Henderson v. State, 59 Okla. Crim. 86, 56 P.2d
915 (1936); Commonwealth v. Beck, 122 Pa. Super. 123, 184 A. 761 (1936) (recognized);
Tucker v. State, 149 Tenn. 98, 257 S.W. 850 (1924); Wharton v. State, 156 Tex. Crim.
326, 248 S.W.2d 739 (1952).
82. State v. Rowell, 172 Iowa 208, 154 N.W. 488 (1915).
83. See notes 78 through 80 supra.
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charged are the subject of proper cross-examination. Such rumors
are not relevant to the reputation of the defendant at the time the
crime was perpetrated. Moreover, the reputation of the accused will
probably be less desirable as the result of his having been charged
with a criminal act. Therefore, testimony as to rumors or reports
heard after the perpetration of the crime charged should not be per-
mitted." Hopefully, Indiana courts would agree.
5.) Hypothetical Questions
The issue of whether hypothetical questions (assuming the ac-
cused to be guilty of some prior misconduct when there is no
evidence thereof) may be posed to the defendant's character
witnesses upon cross-examination did not arise in Indiana until 1953.
While in some states such questions are not permitted,85 it would
seem that they are admissible in Indiana.
In Jordan v. State," the accused, who was charged with
murder, called a witness who attested to the defendant's good
character. On cross-examination the prosecutor was permitted to
ask this witness three hypothetical questions over the objections of
defense counsel. The first of these questions asked "let us assume if
it should be a fact, that the defendant has been arrested and con-
victed several times for other crimes, would the fact change your
opinion?"87 The other two questions, while requiring different
assumptions, were posed in the same form." Nothing in the
84. Cases following this rule: Hallman v. State, 35 Ala. App. 534, 50 So. 2d 6
(1951); People v. Lagie, 321 Mich. 303, 32 N.W.2d 458 (1948); State v. Carroll, 188
S.W.2d 22 (Mo. 1945); State v. Steenson, 35 N.J. Super. 103, 113 A.2d 203 (1955)
(recognized); State v. Holly, 155 N.C. 485, 71 S.E. 450 (1911); Steyh v. State, 58 Okla.
Crim. 258, 52 P.2d 121 (1935); Commonwealth v. Becker, 326 Pa. 105, 191 A. 351 (1937);
Tucker v. State, 149 Tenn. 98, 257 S.W. 850 (1954); Brown v. State, 120 Tex. Crim. 95,
47 S.W.2d 290 (1932).
85. Pittman v. United States, 42 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1930); Mullins v. State, 31
Ala. App. 571, 19 So. 2d 845 (1944); People v. Fowzer, 127 Cal. App. 2d 742, 274 P.2d
471 (1954); State v. Keul, 233 Iowa 852, 241 N.W. 873 (1932); State v. Williams, 16 N.J.
Super. 372, 84 A.2d 746 (1951).
86. Jordan v. State, 232 Ind. 265, 110 N.E.2d 751 (1953).
87. 232 Ind. at 268, 110 N.E.2d at 752.
88.
2. Let us assume that the defendant was arrested and convicted in 1945
for assault and battery, would that change your opinion as to his
reputation for peace and quietude?
3. Let us assume that the defendant in March, 1950, was arrested and
convicted for being drunk in a public place, and in September, 1950,
was arrested and convicted of a violation of the Fire Arms Act,
would that change your opinion as to his reputation for peace and
quietude?
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language of the opinion indicates the actual occurrence of these ar-
rests and convictions. Admission of this testimony was held not to con-
stitute error.
Where evidence as to prior misconduct of the accused has
already been presented, it would not seem to be particularly pre-
judicial to the defendant to allow hypothetical questions assuming
that same misconduct. The jury has already heard about the past
acts and mere repetition is not likely to greatly alter their opinions.
However, the practice of allowing the state to ask the defendant's
character witnesses hypothetical questions concerning supposed
former misdeeds of the accused, the occurence of which is unsup-
ported by other evidence, seems dubious at best.
It it true that when inquiring about former reprehensible
behavior on the part of the accused the prosecutor must in good
faith reasonably believe that the misconduct actually happened. 9
But the primary danger of the hypothetical lies not in the possibility
that the misdeeds were never perpetrated by the defendant. The
problem is with the form of the question. If a witness is asked
whether he has heard reports of a certain misdeed of the accused of
which he is not in fact aware, he can answer in the negative. But
when asked a question such as "Let us assume that in 1967, the
defendant was convicted of murder, would that change your opinion
as to his reputation for peace and quietude?" the witness is bound to
answer that it would.
The whole sequence of question and answer seems cleverly
designed to give the jury a bad impression of the defendant's
reputation despite the fact that the witness being cross-examined
may be aware of nothing unsavory in-the past conduct of the accus-
ed. Although a hypothetical question will not change the reputation
of the defendant in the eyes of the witness, it may well paint a sor-
did picture for the jury. Therefore, it appears logical to exclude this
type of question as unduly prejudicial.
As has been shown, Indiana aligns with the majority in allowing
a character witness for the accused to be cross-examined regarding
rumors or reports of the defendant's past misdeeds. An excep-
tion is the undesirable position on hypothetical questions which was
discussed above. It is also important to consider whether the
witness may be cross-examined as to his actual knowledge of past
criminal acts of the accused.
89. See notes 120 through 124 infra
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WITNESS'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE DEFENDANT'S MISDEEDS AS FACT:
"HAVE YOU HEARD?" AS OPPOSED TO "DO YOU KNOW?"
A witness called to attest to the good character of the defen-
dant may not testify as to his firsthand knowledge of the accused's
behavior, but only as to the defendant's reputation." On cross-
examination the state may attempt to refute this testimony by ask-
ing the witness about rumors or reports of specific past acts of
misconduct by the accused."' The danger of prejudice arising from
cross-examination of character witnesses concerning the accused's
past misdeeds is widely recognized. 2 Thus, the only reason for
which it is allowed is to test the witnesses' credibility and to plumb
the true depth of their knowledge of the defendant's reputation for
character. 3
Because of a general desire on the part of courts to limit the
danger of biasing the jury against the accused, a character witness
may not, in many jurisdictions, be cross-examined as to his personal
knowledge of specific past acts of misconduct perpetrated by the
defendant." Nor may the prosecutor pose questions to the witness
in terms that infer actual knowledge of a past misdeed of the ac-
cused. 5 Therefore, it is usually required that when the prosecutor
cross-examines a character witness as to rumors or reports of past
misconduct on the part of the accused, the question must be posed
in the form of "Have you heard?" as opposed to "Do you know?""
90. See note 10 supra.
91. See notes 19 through 21 supra.
92. See note 25 supra
93. See notes 22 and 23 supra.
94. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948); Vinsaw v. State, 247 Ala.
22, 22 So. 2d 344 (1945); People v. Grimes, 148 Cal. App. 2d 747, 307 P.2d 932 (1957);
State v. Keul, 233 Iowa 852, 5 N.W.2d 849 (1942); Lain v. Commonwealth, 287 Ky. 134,
151 S.W.2d 1055 (1941); Comi v. State, 202 Md. 472, 97 A.2d 128, cert denied, 346 U.S.
898 (1953); Magee v. State, 198 Miss. 642, 22 So. 2d 245 (1945); State v. Carroll, 188
S.W.2d 22 (Mo. 1945) (recognized as a general rule); State v. Steenson, 35 N.J. Super.
103, 113 A.2d 203 (1955); People v. Fay, 270 App. Div. 261, 59 N.Y.S.2d 127, aff'd, 296
N.Y. 510, 68 N.E.2d 453, affd 332 U.S. 261 (1945); Commonwealth v. Hurt, 163 Pa.
Super. 232, 68 A.2d 828 (1948); Adams v. State, 158 Tex. Crim. 306, 255 S.W.2d 512
(1953).
95. Roberson v. United States, 237 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1956); Patrick v. State,
39 Ala. App. 240, 97 So. 2d 589 (1957); Spinks v. State, 92 Ga. App. 878, 90 S.E.2d 590
(1955); People v. Hermens, 5 Ill. 2d 277, 125 N.E.2d 500 (1955); State v. Wheelock, 218
Iowa 178, 254 N.W. 313 (1934) (recognized); People v. Hill, 258 Mich. 79, 241 N.W. 873
(1932) (recognized); State v. Gress, 250 Minn. 337, 84 N.W.2d 616 (1957); Magee v.
State, 198 Miss. 642, 22 So. 2d 245 (1945); Commonwealth v. Hurt, 163 Pa. Super. 232,
60 A.2d 828 (1948); Pitcock v. State, 168 Tex. Crim. 204, 324 S.W.2d 855 (1959).
96. Kasper v. United States, 225 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1955); Jarrell v. State, 35
Ala. App. 256, 50 So. 2d 767, rev'd on other grounds, 255 Ala. 128, 50 So. 2d 774, affd,
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The exceptions to this rule involve those past acts of the defen-
dant which are of a public nature. These may include arrests, indict-
ments and convictions. It seems that where this kind of misconduct
is involved the defendant's character witness may be cross-examined
as to his personal knowledge of the deed.97 The reason is that the
charges are public, have been reported in the community, and have
affected the reputation of the accused. Therefore, the witness need
not have heard them from another source.98
From the opinion of the court in Jordon v. State," one may
reasonably conclude that Indiana allows cross-examination of the
defendant's character witnesses concerning their actual knowledge
of past public indictments, arrests and convictions of the defendant.
However, Indiana is not so clearly in accord with the broader rule
that witnesses who have attested to the good character of the accus-
ed may not be cross-examined with regard to their personal
knowledge of other past misdeeds of the defendant.
This was not always true. Historically, cross-examination of
character witnesses as to their personal knowledge of instances of
the defendant's prior misconduct was not permitted in Indiana. In
Redman v. State,' an 1820 case, the admission of evidence concern-
ing the accused's confinement in jail on a matter not involving the
case at bar was held to constitute error.
While it is unclear from the opinion whether or not this
evidence came in on cross-examination, the Redman case was cited
in a later decision, Engleman v. State,' where the court found
reversible error for the following reason: "On the trial the defendant
called witnesses to his general good character. The state was per-
mitted, on cross-examination, over the objection of the defendant, to
prove particular acts of his bad conduct. This was wrong."'
0 2
255 Ala. 209, 50 So. 2d 776 (1949); People v. Neal, 85 Cal. App. 2d 765, 194 P.2d 57
(1948); State v. Wheelock, 218 Iowa 178, 254 N.W. 313 (1934); Laine v. Commonwealth,
287 Ky. 134, 151 S.W.2d 1055 (1941); Comi v. State, 202 Md. 472, 97 A.2d 129, cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 898 (1953); Magee v. State, 198 Miss. 642, 22 So. 2d 248 (1945); State v.
Carroll, 188 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. 1945) (recognized as a general rule); State v. Steenson, 35
N.J. Super. 103, 113 A.2d 203 (1955); Commonwealth v. Hurt, 163 Pa. Super. 232, 60
A.2d 828 (1948); Herriago v. State, 158 Tex. Crim. 362, 255 S.W.2d 516 (1953).
97. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 191.
98. 1&
99. 232 Ind. at 268, 110 N.E.2d at 752 (Hypothetical questions were asked
which required the witness to assume actual knowledge of past arrests and convictions
of the defendant.).
100. Redman v. State, 1 Blackf. 96 (1820).
101. Engleman v. State, 2 Ind. 91 (1850).
102. 2 Ind. at 97.
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Throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century, only the
"Have you heard?" form of question was allowed in cross-examining
character witnesses as to past misdeeds of the accused.'
The turn of the century saw the beginning of a very gradual
erosion in Indiana of the rule that character witnesses may not be
cross-examined with regard to their personal knowledge of specific
instances of the accused's past misconduct. The first element to
disappear was the requirement of the "Have you heard?" form of
question.
This occurred in the case of Baehner v. State,10' which involved
a tavern owner who was charged with the unlawful sale of liquor on
Sunday. The prosecution was permitted to cross-examine a witness
who had attested to the good reputation of the accused "as respects
keeping a saloon" by asking whether the witness "had seen a slot
machine in his [defendant's] room?"'"5 Other witnesses were ques-
tioned as to whether they "knew" of a slot machine in the accused's
saloon.'"
Although the questions were asked in a form which indicates
actual knowledge on the part of the witnesses, the appellate court
held that admitting the testimony did not constitute abuse of discre-
tion. In the opinion, the court used the following language:
There was no reversible error in permitting these ques-
tions to be asked. They were competent upon the question
of the witness's credibility, and appellant [defendant] was
entitled, had he asked it, to an instruction that such
evidence should be considered by the jury only as affec-
ting the credibility of the character witness.'
Thus, the law in Indiana after Baehner was that while the "Have
you heard?" form of question was not necessarily required on cross-
examination of the defendant's character witness, past misdeeds of
the defendant could be inquired about only for the purpose of
discrediting the witness. Such testimony was not allowed for the
purpose of proving the occurrence of the acts of misconduct about
which the witness was cross-examined.
103. Shears v. State, 147 Ind. 51, 46 N.E. 331 (1899); Randall v. State, 132 Ind.
539, 32 N.E. 395 (1892); McDonel v. State, 90 Ind. 320 (1883).
104. Baehner v. State, 25 Ind. App. 597, 58 N.E. 741 (1900).
105. 25 Ind. App. at 599, 58 N.E. at 742.
106. Id
107. Id.
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The effect of the rule was further weakened in Jordon v.
State,"0 8 a 1953 Indiana case. In Jordan the supreme court stated
that when a defendant tenders his good character in evidence, he in-
vites disclosure of specific instances of his misconduct to detract
from the testimony of his character witness "although the answers
elicited may incidentally impute to him other guilt."' 9 This language
indicates that it is acceptable for the jury to hear testimony as to
the actual occurrence of past misdeeds of the defendant which may
"impute to him other guilt," so long as the testimony is introduced
only for the purpose of testing the credibility of the defendant's
character witness. However, this limitation was done away with in
1973 when the Indiana Supreme Court took the position that a
witness who has attested to the good character of accused may be
cross-examined as to his personal knowledge of former misdeeds
perpetrated by the accused.
The trial court in Lineback v. State110 permitted the prosecutor
to pose the following question to the defendant's character witness:
"Did you know that on the 23rd day of March, 1963, he [defendant]
was found to be an incorrigible juvenile?" ' Upon appeal, and again
upon rehearing the supreme court found that the testimony was prop-
erly admitted.
The form in which the question was asked indicates personal
knowledge on the part of the witness as to the occurrence of the
event inquired about. Moreover, the incident of the defendant's hav-
ing been declared an incorrigible juvenile does not fall within the ex-
ception which permits cross-examination of the defendant's
character witnesses with regard to their personal knowledge of such
past public misdeeds of the accused as arrests, indictments and con-
victions."1 A character witness may be questioned as to his actual
knowledge of this type of act only because it is a matter of public
record and is therefore assumed to have affected the defendant's
reputation in his home community."1 This logic does not apply to the
juvenile record of an accused. As the Indiana Supreme Court stated
in the Lineback rehearing, "juvenile matters are secret and the
results thereof are not open to public scrutiny as a general proposi-
108. 232 Ind. 265, 110 N.E.2d 751 (1953).
109. 232 Ind. at 269, 110 N.E.2d at 753.
110. 260 Ind. 503, 296 N.E.2d 788, affd on rehearing, 260 Ind. 503, 301 N.E.2d
636 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 929 (1974).
111. 260 Ind. at 508, 301 N.E.2d at 637.
112. See notes 97 through 99 supra.
113. See note 98 supra.
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tion ...."114 Therefore, the defendant's being declared an "incorrigi-
ble juvenile" should not have been considered a public act.
Assuming this to be true, a probable legitimate interpretation
of Lineback would be that there is no longer any requirement in In-
diana for the use of the "Have you heard?" form in cross-examining
the defendant's character witnesses. Furthermore, such witnesses'
actual knowledge of instances of past misconduct appears to be
within the scope of proper cross-examination. In the words of the
Lineback court, when an accused introduces evidence of his reputa-
tion for good character, he "opens his entire life to scrutiny . 1.1."I5
There are, however, distinct disadvantages in permitting
witnesses who have attested to the good character of the defendant
to be cross-examined as to their knowledge of the accused's past
misdeeds. It has been established that on direct examination of
character witnesses the defendant may elicit only testimony as to
his good reputation for character."' Appropriately, the only reason
for which the state is allowed to cross-examine the defendant's
character witnesses concerning specific past misdeeds is to test the
witnesses' credibility and their knowledge of the reputation of the
accused. 7 This purpose is not well served by the rule applied in
Lineback.
Testimony as to the witness' specific knowledge of the defen-
dant's past misconduct is not as illustrative of the witness'
knowledge of the reputation of the accused as is testimony to the ef-
fect that the witness has heard rumors or reports of that miscon-
duct. Actual knowledge of the act may lie with the witness alone
and have no bearing on general reputation in the community.
Rumors or reports of the misdeed have at least a limited circulation.
It is by way of rumors or reports of the defendant's behavior that
his reputation in the community is established. By the same token,
the character witness' having heard rumors or reports of past acts
of misconduct by the defendant is more indicative of the credibility
of his testimony as to reputation than is his personal knowledge of
the defendant's former misdeeds. A witness who has heard nothing
but good in the community concerning the defendant's behavior can
truthfully testify that the defendant's reputation is good, despite the
witness' personal knowledge of the defendant's misconduct. On the
other hand, it would seem very inconsistent for a witness to testify
114. 2 Ind. at 508, 301 N.E.2d at 637.
115. Id.
116. See note 10 supra.
117. See notes 22 and 23 supra.
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on direct examination that the accused has a good reputation in the
community and then to admit on cross-examination that he has
heard rumors to the effect that the accused had at one time engaged
in a reprehensible act.
Evidence of a character witness' actual knowledge of the defen-
dant's past misdeeds therefore has comparatively little value.
Nonetheless, it can be highly prejudicial to the accused for two
primary reasons. First, since the defendant may not generally in-
troduce evidence of the fact of any specific good deeds on his part, 18
he has no effective means of countering testimony as to his specific
misconduct. Second, when a witness testifies that he has heard that
the accused formerly engaged in some deplorable act, it is not cer-
tain that such conduct actually occurred. But if the witness is allow-
ed to state that he knows that the defendant perpetrated some past
misconduct, the fact of the deed is proven. Logically, the jury will
more likely be biased against a person that they know was involved
in previous misconduct than someone who is rumored to have
formerly committed a misdeed.
In considering whether a character witness should be cross-
examined concerning rumors or reports of particular past acts of the
accused many courts have reasoned that the value of the testimony
outweighs the danger of prejudice."9 However, cross-examination as
to a witness' actual knowledge of the defendant's past misdeeds has
less probative value than that concerning rumors or reports, and it
is more apt to bias the jurors. One must conclude that the danger of
permitting testimony regarding specific knowledge of the accused's
prior misconduct overshadows any small benefit to be gained by ad-
mitting such evidence. Therefore, it is the conlusion of this note that
the rule of the majority of jurisdictions, which disallows cross-
examination of the defendant's character witnesses as to their
knowledge of specific instances of the defendant's misconduct, is
the superior view.
GOOD FAITH OF THE CROSS-EXAMINER
It has generally been held that questions posed by the state in
the cross-examination of a character witness must be asked in good
118. I WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 195. Accord, Griffith v. State, 140 Ind. 163.
39 N.E. 440 (1895).
119. See cases collected in III A WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 988 (Chadbourne
rev. 1970).
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faith.' 12 This good faith requirement is usually taken to mean that
the prosecutor must have some reasonable basis for believing that
the misdeeds about which he asks have actually occurred or
are rumored to have occurred. 2 '
The purpose behind requiring good faith questioning of
character witnesses is to restrict the potential for abuse of cross-
examination by unscrupulous attorneys. 122 There is a temptation to
question the witness about past misdeeds which exist only in the
fertile mind of the prosecutor. In the words of Justice Jackson, the
prosecution should not be allowed to "ask a groundless question to
waft an unwarranted inuendo into the jury box."'"
Some courts and writers have urged that ensuring good faith
in the cross-examination of the defendant's character witnesses
should not be left entirely to the discretion of the trial court. They
would require a prior showing by the prosecutor of the basis for his
belief in the truth of the matter about which he proposes to cross-
examine the witness. 4 Such showing would be made out of the
presence of the jury.
120. United States v. Cummings, 468 F.2d 274 (1972); People v. Wrigley, 69 Cal.
2d 149, 443 P.2d 580, 70 Cal. Rptr. 1163 (1968); State v. Carter, 222 Iowa 474, 269 N.W.
445 (1936) (recognized); State v. Pierce, 208 Kan. 19, 490 P.2d 584 (1971); Girkey v.
Commonwealth, 240 Ky. 389, 42 S.W.2d 516 (1931); State v. Carroll, 188 S.W.2d 22 (Mo.
1945); State v. Steenson, 35 N.J. Super. 103, 113 A.2d 203 (1955); People v. Alamo, 23
N.Y.2d 630, 246 N.E.2d 496, 298 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1969); Miller v. State, 418 P.2d 220
(Okla. Crim. 1966); State v. Bateliam, 94 Or. 524, 186 P. 5 (1919); State v. Lyles, 210
S.C. 87, 41 S.E.2d 625 (1947); Villariel v. State, 163 Tex. Crim. 654, 295 S.W.2d 222
(1956); Kanter v. Commonwealth, 171 Va. 524, 199 S.E. 477 (1938).
121. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948); People v. Gambrano, 33
Cal. App. 2d 200, 91 P.2d 221 (1939); State v. Rounds, 216 Iowa 131, 248 N.W. 500
(recognized); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 269 Ky. 656, 108 S.W.2d 645 (1937); State v.
Hastings, 477 S.W.2d 108 (Mo. 1972); State v. Steenson, 35 N.J. Super. 103, 113 A.2d
203 (1955) (recognized); People v. Alamo 23 N.Y.2d 630, 246 N.E.2d 496, 298 N.Y.S.2d
681 (1969) (recognized); Lowrey v. State, 87 Okla. Crim. 313, 197 P.2d 637 (1948); State
v. Lyles, 210 S.C. 87, 41 S.E.2d 625 (1947); Hart v. State, 447 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Crim.
1969); Kanter v. State, 171 Va. 524, 199 S.E. 477 (1938) (recognized); State v. Cyr, 40
Wash. 2d 840, 246 P.2d 480 (recognized). In the Indiana civil case of Oliver v. Pate, 43
Ind. 132 (1873), the Supreme Court of Indiana found that no error had been committed
by the trial court in rejecting a question asked on cross-examination of a character
witness for one of the parties because it involved an alleged past misdeed of the party
of which "[tihere was not even a charge that he was guilty, or that anybody in his
neighborhood ever charged, suspected or believed he was." Because of the obvious
danger of abuse in cross-examination of defendant's character witnesses, it is felt that
Indiana would extend this idea to require good faith in criminal cases.
122. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
123. 335 U.S. 481.
124. 335 U.S. 469; United States v. West, 460 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1968); Gross v.
United States, 394 F.2d 216 (8th Cir. 1968); People v. Rutamata, 140 Colo. 233, 343 P.2d
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Indiana has not yet adopted this procedure, although it is clear-
ly desirable. Under this system questions posed to character
witnesses concerning past misdeeds of the defendant would be
systematically screened by the trial court before they could be
heard by the jury. Such a procedure could be relatively effective in
weeding out questions as to non-existent rumors or reports of past
misdeeds. Inquiries of this nature are undesirable because they have
no probative value and their only effect can be to unfairly prejudice
the jury.
CONCLUSION
Indiana is in accord with the majority of states in allowing
cross-examination of character witnesses as to rumors or reports of
past misdeeds of the accused. Certain limitations are placed upon
such cross-examination, however. With regard to the source of the
rumors or reports, it is clear that while some jurisdictions allow
testimony concerning the defendant's reputation in any "probative
community," Indiana follows the traditional rule and requires that
the accused's reputation be that which prevails in his community of
residence. There is no indication that Indiana courts require that
rumors or reports about which a character witness is cross-
examined be heard from a minimum number of persons. Moreover,
the courts of Indiana could logically be expected to allow evidence of
media reports, so long as they are read or heard in the community
in which the defendant lives.
The extent and scope of cross-examination of witnesses who
have attested to the good reputation of the accused is largely within
the discretion of the trial court. However, certain general rules have
been established in this area. For example, the argument could be
made that testimony regarding specific details of rumored past
misdeeds of the accused is without significant probative value and is
highly prejudicial. Thus, some jurisdictions exclude this kind of
evidence. Hopefully, Indiana will follow suit.
Indiana aligns with the majority of jurisdictions in limiting the
scope of cross-examination of character witnesses to rumored or
reported misdeeds involving the same character trait as the crime
with which the defendant is charged. Under this rule inquiry into
1058 (1959); State v. Hinton, 206 Kan. 500, 479 P.2d 910 (1971); People v. Dorikas, 354
Mich. 303, 92 N.W.2d 305 (1958); State v. Steenson, 35 N.J. Super. 103, 113 A.2d 203
(1955); Miller v. State, 418 P.2d 220 (Okla. Crim. 1966). See also MCCORMICK, supra note
1, at § 191.
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rumors or reports of the accused's prior commission of similar acts
of misconduct is permissible, as is the questioning of character
witnesses concerning reported past arrests, prosecutions, or convic-
tions of the defendant.
In considering limitations imposed by the time element on the
cross-examination of character witnesses, it it concluded that the
courts of Indiana would probably disallow testimony as to past
misdeeds of the accused which are very remote in time from the
commission of the crime for which the defendant is on trial. The
length of time which would render misconduct too remote is not
established, but it is clear that cross-examination regarding former
acts which occurred eight years before the perpetration of the crime
charged has been allowed in this state. Also, it may be reasonably
inferred that Indiana does not permit the questioning of character
witnesses concerning either reports of misdeeds of the accused
which were committed after the crime for which he is being tried or
rumors or reports heard by the witness subsequent to the commis-
sion of the crime charged.
Hypothetical questions assuming the accused to be guilty of
some prior misconduct when there is no evidence thereof are within
the scope of proper cross-examination of character witnesses in In-
diana. However, some states do not allow this kind of question. The
preferable view is that hypotheticals of this nature should be exclud-
ed as unduly prejudicial.
While a majority of jurisdictions permit the prosecution to
cross-examine character witnesses regarding rumors or reports of
the defendant's past misdeeds, most states do not allow inquiry as
to a witness' actual knowledge of specific instances of former
misconduct of the accused. An exception is usually made in the case
of past public acts such as indictments, arrests, and convictions. In-
diana was initially in accord. However, a gradual process of erosion
culminating in Lineback v. State,' has destroyed the rule that
character witnesses may not be cross-examined concerning their ac-
tual knowledge of the defendant's past misdeeds in Indiana.
This note concludes that evidence elicited on cross-examination
as to a witness's personal knowledge of former misconduct of the ac-
cused is not only of very low probative value, but is highly pre-
judicial to the defendant. It should therefore be excluded.
125. Lineback v. State, 260 Ind. 503, 296 N.E.2d 788, affd on rehearing, 260
Ind. 503, 301 N.E.2d 636 (1973), cert denied, 415 U.S. 929 (1974).
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Questions posed to a character witness on cross-examination
must be asked in good faith. It is proposed that a hearing held out
of the presence of the jury could be a relatively effective method of
eliminating groundless questions as to former misdeeds of the defen-
dant. The prosecutor would be required to show that he has a
reasonable basis for believing that misconduct about which he
desires to cross-examine a character witness did in fact occur. This
procedure has been advocated by a few courts and writers, but has
not been adopted in Indiana.
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